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Abstract—From the perspective of stimulating intermodal
transport as an ecological and economically promising freight
transport scheme in the EU, this paper is devoted to assess its
future position with respect to crucial and plausible operational
factors that were selected a priori. The study is conducted in the
context of a best-case scenario development, within a rational
and optimal decision making framework. We address this goal
by designing a realistic medium-term network design and pricing
model, from the economic perspective of a typical intermodal
operator, fitted to the sequential mathematical structure of bilevel
programming. Based on real-life sized data, in and through
Belgium, the results underline the costly position of rail transport
and a clear correlation between the competitiveness of intermodal
transport on one side, and the market size and the trucking
competition's price on the other. It is additionally suggested that
intermodal transport can benefit from small rail subsidies in the
early market covering stages.
Index Terms—intermodal transport, scenario analysis, bilevel
programming, Stackelberg games, joint design and pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The European conference of ministers of transport [1]
defined intermodal transport as the movement of goods, in
one and the same loading unit (or vehicle), by successive
modes of transport without handling the goods themselves
when changing modes. Generally, rail or inland waterways
(IWW) are used for most of the traveled route, known as the
main haulage, and road for the shortest possible initial and
final parts of the transport chain, known as the pre- and post-
haulage (pph) or drayage operations.
In recent years, intermodal freight transport has claimed a
rightful position among policy makers and researchers as a
sustainable and ecological alternative in most cases ( [2]; [3]).
Furthermore, when broadly adopted, it provides significant
opportunities to generate economies of scale through freight
consolidation and higher load factors ( [4]; [5]). These two
previous reasons have hitherto fueled a wide interest to en-
hance the position of intermodal transport in the EU market
and divert freight flows to its favor. This is greatly in line
with the roadmap set by the European Commission's White
Paper [6] to shift 30% of road freight over 300 km to less
environmentally harmful modes by the year 2030 and more
than 50% by 2050.
Nevertheless, the above figures remain highly ambitious goals
as intermodal transport has so far failed to attract the desired
customer levels on most freight corridors in Europe when
compared with its main competitor: all-road transport. This
is clearly manifested in the current great imbalance in modal
split on land with 71.3% of the EU freight transport still
taking place via road [7]. Indeed, this relatively weak position
of intermodality represents the main starting point of the
research project [8], to which this paper belongs. The main
goal of the project is to develop a blue print, outlining the
necessary criteria and conditions for developing an innovative
intermodal network, in and through Belgium, as part of the
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the European
single transport area, with a particular focus on rail freight
transport. Building upon existing knowledge, the problem is
approached from an interdisciplinary perspective, concentrated
around five main streams: the optimal corridor and hub
development, the macro-economic impact, the sustainability
impact, the effective market regulation and the corresponding
governance and organization. Based on existing literature and
published studies, a profound analysis of the current strengths
and weaknesses is documented, together with potential trends
and barriers in the future development of intermodal transport,
in the framework of a SWOT analysis [9]. An exhaustive
list of elements has been identified, analyzed and, lastly,
translated into a number of quantifiable scenarios, containing
the most plausible future events affecting the development of
intermodal transport, particularly in Belgium. The analysis is
performed according to three levels: best-, worst- and middle-
case scenario [10]. The notion of scenario is used throughout
the research with the interpretation of offering insights into
the future, without attempting to forecast its exact nature.
As contributors to this wide scope, within the optimal corridor
and hub development perspective, we aim through this study to
provide guidelines and outlooks as to the effect of a number of
operational factors, namely: costs of running freight services,
growth of freight demands and setting taxes or subsidies,
on the competitiveness and the future success of intermodal
transport in the EU, according a special attention to the role
of Belgium. We discuss in this research work the results
with respect to the best-case scenario. A reference point of
comparison is taken to be the present day situation. The paper
is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to explaining the
adopted methodologies and mathematical framework. Section
3 outlines the scenario's description and its corresponding
translation in the context of the devised models. The obtained
results are analyzed in section 4 and the discussion is finally
concluded in section 5 with the most notable takeaways and
the potential work extension.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Background
The complex nature and interleaved procedures along the
intermodal transport chains provided interesting topics of
research and investigation to the field of Operations Research,
whose techniques we deploy in our study. The first devel-
oped multi-modal network models that were able to handle
intermodal flows appeared in the early 1990s [11]. The most
notable considered decision problems are terminals location-
allocation, internalizing external costs, consolidation strategies
and service network design.
A particular aspect that closely affects intermodal transport
competitiveness, and that is yet under-investigated in the
corresponding literature, is the determination of the right
service tariffs, known as the pricing strategy [12]. Generally
speaking, pricing strategies are distinguishable in the way they
handle the interplay between profitability and competitiveness.
A service price has to be high enough to cover its costs, and
hence generate a profit, and low enough to remain attractive
to the target customers. [12] identify two levels, at which the
pricing strategy operates. First, at the level of the individual
actor in the intermodal chain, previous studies were mainly
concerned with calculating opportunity costs and providing
educated pricing guidelines, mostly from the perspective of
the network (mainhaul) and the drayage operators. Second,
at the whole door-to-door level, service pricing decisions are
taken from the perspective of the service providers (carriers),
while accounting for the potential competition and the target
customers' (shippers') choices. As pointed out by the literature
review in [13], there is a peculiar gap in the literature of solid
optimization approaches tackling intermodal pricing problems
that belong to the latter category. Nevertheless, their relative
importance and relevance to the competitiveness of intermodal
transport is acknowledged through the conducted SWOT anal-
ysis within the BRAIN-TRAINS project [9].
Additionally, these types of decisions are closely entwined
with the related services' operating costs, also ranked on top of
the operational elements in the SWOT analysis and resulting
from the service design decisions. We opt through our analysis
to highlight the non-trivial tradeoff between these two parallel
problem streams: pricing intermodal services as received by
the target clients and designing the corresponding service
network.
B. Modelling approach
Our methods stem from the concepts of Mathematical
Programming, which aim at translating a managerial problem
into a mathematical model, within an optimization framework.
We address a tactical, medium-term decision horizon, from
an economic perspective. The decision maker is namely an
intermodal transport operator/service provider. To approach the
problem in a robust manner, the model is developed and results
are analysed over two subsequent stages: Service Network
Design and Joint Design and Pricing models. In what follows,
we elaborate on the adopted modelling framework in each of
them.
a) Service network design: In order to gain insights
about the costs influence on the partition of the flows over the
modes of transportation in the network, we start by considering
a tactical intermodal service network design problem, from
the perspective of a transport service provider operating on
a road-rail-IWW network. The decisions to be taken are two-
fold: (1) the frequencies of the services over a certain period of
time, typically a week; (2) optimal demands' routing over the
service network. A static case is assumed, where the demands
are fixed, as well as the underlying physical network, including
the terminals' locations, throughout the decision process. The
following constraints are particularly taken into account:
• the total container freight demands should be delivered;
• the services' capacities are not to be exceeded by the
transported volumes;
• round long-haul services (>300 km) are enforced, for
resource balancing purposes;
• an itinerary is not to be used, unless a certain fraction
of the demand is sent over it (i.e.: ensuring a minimum
utilization).
At a pre-processing stage, a recursive algorithm is designed
with the purpose of generating, for each Origin-Destination
(O-D) pair, representing a freight demand, a set of feasible
itineraries formed of defined intermodal services. Feasibility
is meant in the context of geographical feasibility, mode
succession and total length with respect to all-road paths.
Mathematically, the model follows the original path-based
service network design formulation by [14] with an adaptation
to the intermodal application context.
b) Joint design and pricing: At a second stage, we build
upon the previous model by jointly considering intermodal
service prices as explicit decision variables. A key issue in
modelling such a decision framework is how to represent
the target shippers' reasoning, and consequently, the demand
volumes of the intermodal services in question. Unlike the
previous case of fixed demands, we utilize the innate hierarchy
in the problem's definition, where demands are dependent
on the decisions taken by the service providers, to better
depict reality. Without loss of generality, we consider a market
situation consisting of small shipping companies that want to
benefit from freight consolidation. The following sequence can
therefore be envisaged; first the intermodal operator chooses
his services' pricing and design strategy, whereas, afterwards,
the target shippers optimally react to those decisions by
choosing (or not) the offered services.
In that sense, a certain optimization framework was proven
adequate for similar hierarchical and non-cooperative decision
schemes, yet largely overlooked in intermodal transport plan-
ning problems, namely: bilevel programming. The concept is
principally adapted from game theory, known under the name
of Stackelberg games [15]. It denotes a game that involves
two sequential layers of players: a leader and one or more
follower(s). By definition, the leader has the privilege of mak-
ing the first move in the game, while being able to anticipate
the optimal reaction of the follower(s) to his chosen strategy.
The leader's solution (or chosen strategy) is decided upon by
working backwards the one maximizing his payoff; the game
is thus played from the point view of the leader. Stackelberg
games are first introduced into mathematical programming
under the self-explanatory name of mathematical programs
with optimization problems in the constraints, later known
as bilevel programs. The joint intermodal service pricing and
design problem is constructed following a bilevel structure as
follows:
TABLE I
BILEVEL STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT DESIGN AND PRICING MODEL
Upper level (leader) Lower level (followers)
Decision maker






• Demand volumes on inter-
modal itineraries
• Demand volumes on truck-
ing itineraries
Objective
Profit maximization Costs minimization
Constraints
• Services' capacities are not
to be exceeded
• Round long-haul services
are enforced
• All demands' are delivered
• Demands can only be sent
on offered/open intermodal
services
The model follows the main bilevel joint pricing and design
structure as originally presented by [16]. The costs from the
followers/shippers' perspective are primarily represented in the
prices they are charged for the acquired transport services.
An assumption that should remain unchanged throughout
the model development is the ability for the competition,
represented in trucking services, to accommodate all the
demands of every shipper firm. It is thus ensured that the
leader/intermodal operator is prevented from setting infinite
tariff schedules on his services. It is equally important to
assume that the competition shows no price or service quality
change throughout the process.
III. SCENARIO TRANSLATION
The main idea of the scenario translation is to invoke
parametric analyses and practically probe the impact of the
different changes in policies and operational circumstances
on the future success of intermodal transport, taking the
above designed mathematical models as rational reasoning
layouts. We essentially adopt two main market views in our
experiments: a domestic scale, where only national flows
within Belgium are considered, and European scale, where
Belgium is regarded as a main start/end point of the flows.
Both real and fictitious freight demands (in tonnes) inspired
by real life are considered, the details of which will be outlined
with each experiment in the next section. In what follows, we
elaborate on the different operational elements considered for
the scenario analysis.
A. SWOT parameters
In accordance to the goals set by the White Paper from
the European Commission (2011), the best-case scenario is
designed to be in line with the first desired 30% shift by the
year 2030, carried by both the government and the transport
sector. Based on the realized SWOT analysis, the results are
translated into a selection of crucial scenario elements and
their corresponding parameters and values. The validation was
performed by the panel of experts of the BRAIN-TRAINS
project according to a so-called Delphi technique, often used
to acquire consensus within a heterogeneous panel of experts
as explained in [9]. Table II shows the considered scenario
inputs and outputs from the operational perspective, among the
total list of scenario parameters, together with the calculated
reference- and best-case values of the inputs. The transport
modes considered for this analysis are road, rail and IWW.
TABLE II












Rail 0.0698 e/tkm 0.0555 e/tkm
IWW 0.0219 e/tkm 0.0198 e/tkm
Road taxes 0.15 e/km 0.18 e/km
Freight demands 0.15
The infrastructure and maintenance costs, as stated in [17]
comprise: the construction costs, the maintenance and opera-
tional costs and the land use costs. The study further provides
a fixed and variable parts division of the costs.
B. Additional operational parameters
In addition to the above stated parameters, other elements
are considered as well to establish necessary operational hy-
potheses and inputs throughout the model runs. The computed
values are based on the norms applied in real life situations
according to the collected industry information. The list of the
additional inputs is composed of:
• all-road/trucking service price (in e/tkm);
• terminals' physical locations.
• transport modes' capacities (in tonnes);
• transport modes' average operating speeds (in km/h).
We consider two cases for the terminals' locations param-
eter. First, at the domestic Belgian level, the locations are
aggregated to the NUTS 3 territorial division level, based
on the setup by [18]. Second, at the whole European level,
we refer to the [19] Europe Database and select 13 terminals
across the continent. As for the transport modes' speeds, we
choose to assume average cases for simplification purposes,
while acknowledging the existing speed variances in terms
of the chosen connections and travelled regions. This is
especially valid for the rail freight transport; for instance, on
the Scandinavian-Mediterranean rail corridor, a requirement
is set to attain an operating speed of 100 km/h. However,
some sections in Austria only allow 80 km/h due to mountain
rail operations. Other speed restrictions for wider bundle of
sections are experienced in Italy as well [20].
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we concentrate on showing the results for
every stage of the modelling. The effects of certain parame-
ters' changes on the intermodal market share, and consequent
modal split, are discussed, according to the reference- and
best-case scenario developments.
A. Service network design
The freight demand data regarded for this experiment were
obtained from [21] at the level 3 of the Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) within Belgium, based
on the accessible Worldnet database [22]. An O-D matrix is
considered comprising 302 commodities/shipping demands,
where all-road paths are enabled for each O-D pair. The
demands should be satisfied by the intermodal operator's or
the all-road itineraries, or a combination of both. Scenario
elements are changed to their best-case values in order to
draw conclusions on the flows partition on the different
transport modes, if the costs of operating services become the
only considered choice criterion. The first row in table III
shows the result when all the parameters are tuned to the
reference scenario. In the subsequent rows, we refer to the
parameter whose value is changed to the best-case scenario
values, in order to test the effect and significance of each
parameter separately until we arrive, at the last row, where
all parameters' values follow those defined in the best-case
scenario.
TABLE III











None a 15.20 84.8 98.74 0 1.26
Road costs 16.58 83.42 98.63 0 1.37
Rail costs 15.20 84.80 98.74 0 1.26
IWW costs 16.57 83.43 98.63 0 1.37
Road taxes 16.57 83.43 98.63 0 1.37
Freight demands 15.62 84.38 98.70 0 1.30
All (best-case) 2.40 97.60 99.80 0 0.20
a Reference scenario.
It is understandable that intermodal transport becomes
highly dominated by all-road transport due to the fact that
we only consider here flows within Belgium (<300 km); a
breakeven distance for intermodality's favour is not reached
considering our hypothesis. A general remark on the above re-
sults is that even in the case that intermodal transport is attract-
ing some flows; rail still does not get any shares despite the
best-case scenario changes. The obvious interpretation for this
can be the relatively high fixed costs for rail (0.0541 e/tkm),
in comparison to those of IWW (0.0205 e/tkm), which makes
it hard to compensate the operation of a new rail service.
Among all the considered parameters, it is evident that the
best-case values of the road costs, IWW costs and road taxes
have the highest influence. Despite the previous remark, when
all values are changed collectively to the best-case scenario, a
negative impact is observed on the intermodal share and modal
split (last row). This shows that, in the case of increasing
shipping demands, the slight decrease in all-road costs attracts
most flows, even when combined with a greater decrease in
the remaining rail and IWW costs. It equally suggests that
the increasing road taxes, due to their presence in the pph
parts in the intermodal transport chain, deter more flows from
intermodal paths than it does from all-road paths.
Using the same model, the costs' scope is generalized to
account for service quality aspects, namely, transit time, which
will potentially become pronounced on large corridors. The
longer-than-necessary delivery times are penalized in the ob-
jective function by a changing value, alongside the costs mini-
mization. The shipping demands are extended to long-distance
O-D pairs across Europe having 73 commodities, inspired by
the announced service connections of a certain intermodal
operator. Driven by the data availability at the European level,
only road-rail connections are considered for intermodal paths.
In order to render the model computationally tractable, rail
distances are calculated based on average increases from the
equivalent road distances. No all-road paths are enabled, and
tests are conducted by altering the transit time penalty value
and observing the change in modal split for road (in pph) and
rail (in long-haulage). The reference values of the remaining
parameters are considered.
TABLE IV












(in hours) Road Rail
0 26 (6) 756 42.71 57.29
2500 26 (7) 220 42.71 57.29
7500 26 (7) 182 37.13 62.87
50000 28 (10) 106 28.38 77.62
As shown by table IV, the higher the weight is put on the
service performance, described in duration, the more the rail
service lines, and the less the transport chain parts carried by
road. This may seem counter-intuitive at the outset, as the
traditional picture of intermodal transport casts an impression
of complicated operations and long transit and transfer times.
Even though the speed of a freight train can equal that of
a conventional passenger train, the numerous stops imposed
on freight trains, as well as the experienced arrival delays,
often reduce their commercial door-to-door speed, resulting in
supply chain disruptions further down the line. This is, in part,
true as the considered model does not fully express the waiting
times at the terminals due to delays and consequent missed
connections, which are repeatedly reported by the involved
actors. However, at an ideal situation, which everyone opts to
achieve, the model shows that it is more beneficial, from the
service quality point of view, to increase the rail, terminal-
to-terminal fast service lines for long distances. This implies
a better connected rail network for continental shipping de-
mands, hence, a minimization of the road parts in intermodal
itineraries, and ultimately a minimization of transfers along
the transport chain.
B. Joint design and pricing
At this second stage, we intend to show the results for
the more realistic case, when the demands are no longer
fixed and assigned to intermodal paths. Instead, we consider a
market where shippers have the choice to send their demands
between two available options: an all-road itinerary with a
fixed price and intermodal itineraries belonging to a single
service provider. A combination of both, or of more intermodal
itineraries, is possible. As previously explained, the problem
is depicted as a hierarchical game, played from the perspective
of the intermodal service provider, deciding on the design the
services, as well as their assigned prices. The same O-D matrix
as in the previous European case study is considered, as well
as the same infrastructure at the level of the road and rail
physical networks. We begin by showing in figures 1 and 2,
for the reference case scenario, the effect of increasing the
all-road prices and the market size, represented in the number
of commodities, on the resulting intermodal market share.
Fig. 1. Impact of the road-borne distance on the intermodal market share.
It is evident from the graphs that intermodal transport would
benefit from increasing competition's trucking price as well
as from increasing the market size constituted of potential
shippers. Indeed, a higher competition's market price implies a
Fig. 2. Impact of the road-borne distance on the intermodal profit margin.
higher ceiling for the intermodal services' prices as well, giving
intermodal service providers a bigger room, from the business
point of view, to make up for the money invested in operating
the services, hence, justify offering more services and attract
a larger market. Likewise, an increasing market size offers
more opportunities for bundling flows and achieving higher
load factors without a big cost increase.
In what follows, we proceed by showing, in table V, the
effect of the change in parameter values, from the reference to
the best-case scenario, on the intermodal market share, modal
split, as well as the profit margin. The all-road/trucking price
is fixed to be 0.08 e/tkm throughout the tests; a value decided
upon according to market price investigations. A total demand
of 73 commodities is considered, as well as a rail service unit
constituted of 2 trains (3000 tonnes). Note that, due to the
unavailability of actual demand data at the European level,
a hypothetical case is examined for comparison purposes,
inspired by typical intermodal operators' announced relations,
where the tests do not impose any maximum bound on the
pph distances within the road-rail intermodal connections.
TABLE V
INFLUENCE OF THE BEST-CASE PARAMETER VALUES ON
PROFITABILITY-DRIVEN INTERMODAL SHARES
Market share Modal split Profit











None a 87.33 12.67 12.67 41.93 45.40 0.41
Road costs 87.41 12.59 12.59 42.94 45.36 41.50
Rail costs 87.39 12.61 12.61 41.95 45.44 51.60
Road taxes 87.39 12.61 12.61 41.95 45.44 0.40
Freight demands 84.77 15.23 15.23 41.77 43.00 0.42
All (best-case) 93.64 6.36 6.36 40.43 53.21 47.20
a Reference scenario.
The above results are obtained with an acceptable optimality
gap of 1-2%. They obviously show that the most significant
of all instruments, in terms of profit margin advantage, are
the rail costs. Although the increasing O-D flow matrix has,
in fact, a negative effect on the intermodal market share,
it does not harm the profit margin. It is equally noticeable
that the collective application of all the parameter values
of the best-case scenario drives the highest improvement on
the intermodal market share and a sufficiently better profit
margin. In order to get closer to the real-life intermodal
transport chains, we impose an upper bound parameter on
the total distance run by road in an intermodal itinerary. The
corresponding change in intermodal market share, as well as
the profit margin is plotted in figures 3 and 4 against the
different values of road distance limit.
Fig. 3. Effect of all-road/trucking market size on the intermodal market share.
Fig. 4. Effect of all-road/trucking market size on the intermodal market share.
Obviously, the best-case scenario dominates the reference
scenario for all considered road distances, in terms of both
the market share and the profit margin. As shown in figure 3,
the market share in both scenarios undergoes a sharp change,
with visible varying severity, at approximately the same road
distance (>100 km), after which, it stabilizes around the same
values. In figure 4, however, the profit margin in the best-case
scenario is stabilized throughout a road distance variation of
300 km, while that of the reference scenario demonstrates a
continuous increase, starting from 200 km, until it eventually
converges with the best-case result. The above apparently
suggests the sensitivity of the conditions imposed on the
intermodal paths' formation, especially in terms of the road
parts' distances, on the competitiveness and profitability of
intermodal freight services in a market of scattered demands.
As the conditions become looser, the ability of intermodal
operators to better tailor their services' according to the mar-
ket structure and demands' locations tends to acquire more
flexibility.
Finally, it is often argued about the significance of the rail
subsidies on the success of the intermodal transport as a
lucrative business, especially in the first stages. Table VI shows
the effect of this parameter, in both the reference and best-case
scenario, on the rate of success and market competitiveness of
intermodal transport. We consider a moderate limit of 250 km
on the distance of the road parts in all intermodal transport
itineraries, as well as a rail service unit constituted of a single
train (1500 tonnes). To decide on the relevant subsidy levels
to be experimented, we analyse the profit margin structure of
the intermodal service provider (leader).
Profit margin = Revenues−Costs
Revenues
= Collected tariffs+S per distance−Fixed costs−V ariable costs
Collected tariffs+S per distance
= 1− (Fixed costs · F ) + (V ariable costs ·Demands)
(Prices ·Demands) + (S · F )
(1)
We observe from the above formulas that, for a certain
service frequency level, F , an increase in subsidies, S, would
imply a proportional increase in the consequent profit and
profit margin. This increase would continue until a subsidy
level is reached that justifies the offering of new services
(increase in frequency) and make up for the related costs,
in particular, the fixed components. Therefore, we choose the
tested subsidy levels, with respect to the considered costs in
each scenario (table II).
TABLE VI

















0 66.19 6.80 14 99.2
5 71.79 10.10 16 99.3
10 71.79 13.71 16 99.3
20 71.79 20.20 16 99.3
25 81.32 20.40 20 94.0
30 81.32 23.30 20 94.0
35 81.32 26.00 20 94.0
40 92.39 24.00 24 86.7
Both tables VI and VII show the general positive impact
of applying subsidies on the competitiveness and profitability
of intermodal transport, though with different intensities and
TABLE VII

















0 74.56 24.11 20 98.5
2 83.05 22.74 22 96.2
5 88.78 23.15 24 94.2
7 88.78 24.54 24 94.2
10 93.62 24.98 26 91.9
12 93.62 26.31 26 91.9
15 96.45 27.30 28 89.9
25 96.45 33.15 30 83.9
consequences. For instance, we notice that the market share, as
well as the load factor, is more sensitive to the small changes
in the subsidy levels in the best-case scenario, than it is in the
reference scenario, especially at the first stages (0-10 e/km).
This can be partially attributed to the difference in costs to be
compensated between the scenarios. On the other hand, the
profit margin shows a continuous and faster increase in the
reference scenario, when compared to the steadier behaviour
in the best-case scenario, for the same subsidy levels (0-25
e/km). A possible interpretation of this previous observation
in the best-case scenario can be the already advantageous
position it is starting from and the greater ability for the
subsidies to help offer more services, hence more costs and
a slower increase of profit, rather than a direct resonance in
costs-free revenues. Furthermore, as opposed to the reference
scenario, market position stagnation is reached in the best-case
scenario with relatively high levels of subsidies (>10 e/km).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In the context of testing the impact of certain instrumen-
tal changes on the intermodal freight transport and drawing
insights about its potential future, we model a medium-term
planning problem from the perspective of a typical intermodal
operator. The decisions are two-fold: the prices of the offered
freight services and the design the service network, in terms
of the frequencies and demand routing. The model follows
the structure of a bilevel joint design and pricing model. The
problem is addressed in two stages. First, a case of fixed
demands is considered, where the pricing decisions are omitted
and conclusions are made with respect to the operating costs.
Second, demands are explicitly modelled as subject to the
services' prices and design decisions, by expressing the rational
behaviour of the target shipper customers within a hierarchi-
cal Stackelberg game model. A competition, represented in
trucking services, is always assumed to be available. Based
on the experiments and obtained results in each case study,
we summarize the most notable conclusions in the following
points:
• From a pure costs perspective, the collective application
of the best-case scenario parameters (i.e., modes oper-
ating costs, road taxes, demand volumes, etc.) suggests
an overall more costly future position of intermodal
transport. A clear favoring of IWW over rail is noticed,
potentially attributed to the high fixed costs of the latter.
• A directly proportional relation exists between the inter-
modal market share, on one hand, and the market size
and the corresponding competition's trucking price, on
the other.
• Both the competitiveness and profitability of inter-
modal transport are found sensitive to the intermodal
paths' structure, namely, in terms of the distance limits
imposed on the road parts.
• In what concerns the rail subsidies, rail-based intermodal
transport, in the future best-case scenario, can benefit
from relatively small subsidies to rapidly cover more mar-
ket, up until a certain level. Afterwards, more subsidies
imply a profit increase, though less load factors.
In order for a clear advantage of intermodality over tra-
ditional transport schemes to materialize, we underline the
importance of the synchronized application of instrumental
changes, with more weight accorded to the most significant
ones. Furthermore, similar models, studying human behaviors
in freight mode choices and their conceivable randomness,
could become more relevant to real-life situations by integrat-
ing discrete choice methods in their approaches, as previously
discussed by [23]. Indeed, a typical methodological extension
could enrich the discussion in the course of the next scenarios
analysis, namely: middle- and worst-case scenarios.
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